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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RACIAL DISCRIMATION IN COLLEGE
SOCIAL FRATERNITIES.-A 1956 resolution of the Board of Regents
of the University of Colorado prohibited discrimination in cam-
pus fraternities because of race, creed, or color.' Ten years later,
a member of the Board expressed doubts about the validity of
Sigma Chi Fraternity's compliance with the resolution, because of
the national organization's suspension of its Stanford University
chapter for alledgedly pledging a Negro.2 As a result, the Regents
unanimously adopted a resolution that, in effect, required Sigma
Chi to prove that there was no discrimination in selection of mem-
bers by the Colorado chapter. At their next meeting, finding that
the proof of non-discriminatory practices was not adequate,3 the
Board further resolved to place the local chapter on probation,
with loss of rushing and pledging privileges, until the chapter
and the national organization could show full compliance with
the 1956 resolution.4 Sigma Chi seeks injunctive relief against en-
forcement of the resolutions. Held: Relief denied. A resolution of
a State Board of Regents prohibiting a fraternity on the campus
of a State university from denying membership to anyone be-
' The primary object of the plaintiffs' concern, this March 19, 1965, resolu-
tion stated that
After September 1, 1962, the University shall place on probation any
fraternity, social organization or other student group that is compelled
by its constitution, ritual or government to deny membership to any
person because of his race, color or religion. During such probation,
no rushing, pledging or initiation of new members shall be permitted.
Brief for Plaintiffs, p.1, Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of Colora-
do, 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).2 Technically, the suspension was for failure to observe ritual, and it climaxed
a longstanding conflict between the Stanford chapter and the national fraternity.
The formal suspension occurred on April 2, 1966, and the pledging took place the
following day, but Sigma Chi had been informed severa days earlier that the
student had been approved by the chapter and there was an intention to pledge
him. This was consistent with an earlier announcement by the chapter that it
would not discriminate in the selection of members. Sigma Chi Fraternity v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 258 F. Supp. 515, 520 (D. Colo. 1966).
3 The findings resulted from correspondence with national officers of Sigma
Chi, officers of the Colorado and Stanford chapters, and Stanford University
officials. Ibid.
4 In September, 1966, the Colorado chapter requested the lifting of the pro-
bation, declaring that they would be autonomous in selection of members. This
request was denied because of failure to sever ties with the national organiza-
tion. Id. at 521.
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cause of race, color, or religion is within the power of the Board
and does not violate the constitutional rights of the national
fraternity and local chapter with respect to freedom of association.
Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 258 F.
Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).
The problem in Sigma Chi was a novel one. Since there were
no cases directly in point, the plaintiffs contended that the 1956
resolution was a violation of their first amendment rights of free-
dom of association.5 Citing recent cases involving the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People [hereinafter
cited as N.A.A.C.P.] concerning the production of membership
lists," Sigma Chi argued that it should receive the same rights of
freedom of speech and assembly accorded that body. The court dis-
tinguished these cases on the grounds that they recognized free-
dom of association for the advancement of views and ideas, where-
as in the case at bar, there was no such overriding purpose.7 "It is
finally, therefore, a matter of viewing the alleged violation in
relationship to the authority of the Regents.""
It is well settled that a state may impose restrictions on state
university students who are members of Greek-letter societies. In
Waugh v. Board of Trustees,9 a Mississippi statute prohibited
members of fraternities from receiving or competing for class
honors, diplomas, or distinctions. The Supreme Court held that
such a prohibition was within the power of the legislature, since
that body controls the university "and has a right to legislate for
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting
... the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961); N.A.A.C.P. v.
State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1940).
7258 F. Supp. at 524. The court stated that the right of association asserted
in N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson was couched in the following
words of the Supreme Court:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, partic-
ularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,
as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. [Citations
omitted.] It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
'liberty' aroused by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment which embraces freedom of speech.
357 U.S. 449, 460-61.
8 258 F. Supp. at 526.
9 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
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their welfare, and to enact measures for their discipline."10
Modem statutes generally vest authority to govern state uni-
versities in boards of regents or trustees, which act as agents of
the legislature and make all appropriate regulations." Rules laid
down by these bodies are given the same force as legislative en-
actments. 12 Thus, it follows that bans on fraternities by a state
university's governing board would be upheld, and in the only
case on this issue that was the result.13 In Webb v. State Univ. of
New York, 14 the Board of Trustees banned all social organizations
affiliated with national groups. After recognizing the authority of
the board to act, the court, in upholding the ban, said: "A state
may adopt such measures, including the outlawing of certain
social organizations, as it deems necessary to its duty of super-
vision and control of its educational institutions."' 5 In another
case, the court held that the Board of Trustees (of Purdue Uni-
versity) could not make membership in a fraternity a disquali-
fication for admission as a student, but then went on to say, as dic-
tum, that "It is clearly within the power of the trustees . .. to
absolutely prohibit any conection between the Greek fraternities
and the University."' 6
I' Id. at 596.
11 COLO. REV. STAT. § 124-2-10 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ORS] provides
that "The Board of Regents shall have the general supervision of the University.-
CRS § 124-2-11 states that "The Board of Regents shall enact laws for the
government of the University."
12Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932). See also State
ex rel. Weaver v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State, 126 Ohio 290, 185 N.E. 196
(1933).
13 A distinction may be made between the authority of boards of trustees of
state universities and boards of private institutions. The former draws its authority
from statute; the latter has no such legislative mandate upon which to rest its
regulations. In Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ. of La., 203 F. Supp.
855 (E.D. La. 1962), rev'd on rehearing, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962), two
students were denied admission to the university solely because they were Negroes.
The court held that Tulane was a private institution (rather than public) and
that actions of the board could not be considered as actions of the state to bring
them within the confines of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, the Yourteenth
amendment limits its application to states and courts may not interfere in in-
stances of private discrimination.
Apparently, then, it may reasonably be concluded that a legislative enact-
ment conferring power on a board of trustees applies only to a board of a
public institution. Boards of private schools do not act as agents of the state, and
thus are free to prohibit or permit discrimination in fraternities as they deem
appropriate.
14 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
15 Id. at 912.
16 State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 285 (1882). For another early
decision supporting the power of the trustees to forbid membership in secret
societies, see People v. Wheaton College, 40 IMI. 186 (1866).
[Vol. 55,
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In similar cases in the future, it is unlikely that other courts
and litigants will be satisfied with the rationale of this decision.
With some 7500 fraternity and sorority chapters on the nation's
campuses, 17 this is certain to be the first in a series of cases treat-
ing the problem of discrimination, and courts will not be able to
evade so simply the underlying issues of freedom of association.
An alternative line of reasoning for the purpose of preventing
discrimination in fraternities, at least in those instances where the
university has leased housing to the organization, 8 is state action,19
violative of the fourteenth amendment.20 By supplying the
housing, the school administration retains control over the con-
duct of the group, not only in relation to social activities and
scholastic achievement, but in selection of members as well.
2 1
Therefore, under this concept of state action, "fraternities which
are provided housing from a state educational institution are sub-
ject to the commands of the fourteenth amendment. 92 2 A pos-
sible solution would be for the universities and the fraternities to
sever all relations.23 By so doing, the fraternity could free itself
from regulation and probably achieve the status of a private,
voluntary, social organization.
2 4
In a truly private organization, the method of selection of
members should not be subject to judicial review, and a rejected
1 7 BAID, MANUAL OF AMEm CAN COLLEGE FR&TERNrrms X (17th ed. 1963).
Is It is quite common for a state university to build a house on state property
which is then leased to the fraternity or sorority (or to a house corporation,
composed of alumni) on a long term basis.
19 Because of the Board of Regents acting as agent for the Colorado legisla-
ture, the decision in Sigma Chi actually is based on one aspect of state action.
But the court did not develop the concept now pursued.
20 "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 Regulations over selection of members include the imposing of time
limits on rushing and pledging, minimum grade averages, and removal of racial
and religious restrictions. Note, 1964 ILL. L. FoRuN 631, 643-44.
22 Id. at 645.
23 Apparently, this is the trend among campus organizations; political organi-
zations, such as Students for a Democratic Society, which are not controlled by
the administration, are numerous.
24 At this point, the problem becomes one between the local chapter and the
national headquarters of the fraternity, which is not here under discussion. Here,
also, a paradox arises. Is it possible that a board of trustees could not regulate the
fraternity in any manner except to absolutely prohibit them (for which there is
precedent-Waugh and Webb)? But if the fraternities completely sever relations,
can the board exert even that power? As to the former question, the only case
that touches upon even a similar issue indicates that the answer might be yes.
See State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278 (1882).
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applicant should not be entitled to relief.2 5 Admission into labor
unions is virtually the only area where courts have uniformly
forbidden discrimination in membership.26 In most other situa-
tions, particularly social and fraternal societies, there has been
absolute discretion in choice of members.27 A distinction has been
made between voluntary and involuntary associations, 28 and in
some cases involving the latter, courts have compelled admission
and full membership. 29 But a social fraternity must be categorized
as a voluntary organization, and thus it escapes the prohibitions
on free selection of members.30
For all practical purposes, Sigma Chi is of no value except as
a forerunner of future similar cases. The court, by skirting the
major issues, established no authoritative precedent. Until the
questions raised by the freedom of association claims are satisfied,
the problem of fraternity discrimination remains.
Carl Timothy Cone
25See Note, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 346, 357 (1963).26 Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1944); Thorman v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958);
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Commission on Civil Rights, 140 Conn. 537,
102 A.2d 366 (1953).27 Note, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 346, 360 (1963).2 8 An example of an involuntary society is one which is necessary for
economic survival, such as a medical association.29 Typical of these cases is Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62
N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960) where the court said that if the exclusion
resulted in substantial injury to the plaintiff, "the court will grant relief." 62 N.J.
Super. 184, 197, 162 A.2d 324, 331.
30 In a discussion of the right of association, Associate Justice William 0.
Douglas said: "In my view, government can neither legislate with respect to nor
probe the intimacies of political, spiritual, or intellectual relationships in the
myriad of lawful societies and groups, whether popular or unpopular, that exist in
this country." Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1361, 1375(1963). In the same article, Justice Douglas quoted the noted historian, Alexis de
Toqueville:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for him-
self, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures
and of acting in common with them. The right of association therefore
appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal
liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of
society.
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1361, 1363.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGU-
LATION AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE.-After removing tile from the floor
of a room in his service station, Calvin Stipes, the manager, and
three employees proceeded, in direct violation of the Standards
[Vol. 55,
